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INTRODUCTION
Investment in Sudan "is a chain of cause and effect in which
American money may finally objectively fund genocide-in which
Americans may come to pay, through no fault or intention of their
own, for crimes they abhor."' On December 31, 2007, in an effort to
condemn the Sudanese government's funding of the genocide in Dar-
fur, Congress enacted the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act
(SADA), which authorizes states to divest any state assets from compa-
nies doing business in Sudan. 2 As of January 2009, twenty-seven states
had adopted statutes that mandate that their state money and state
pension funds divest holdings in companies that perpetuate the geno-
cide.3 Of those states, nineteen have adopted model legislation cre-
ated by the Genocide Intervention Network's Sudan Divestment Task
Force (SDTF Model), and eight have adopted their own legislation. 4
Because the Sudan divestment movement began recently, 5 courts have
had minimal opportunity to address the constitutionality of the state-
created divestment statutes. In National Foreign Trade Council v. Gian-
noulias,6 a 2007 case decided before Congress's recent authorization
of state divestment statutes, a district court held that Illinois' law end-
ing all investments in Sudan was unconstitutional. 7 Other states have
taken a less restrictive approach than Illinois, including those that
have adopted the SDTF Model;8 and even Illinois has since amended
its original divestment statute.
Still, the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), which brought
suit in Giannoulias, may bring suit against other state divestment stat-
utes, even though the NFTC conceded some are "not as bad as Illi-
1 153 CONG. REC. S15, 373 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
2 SeeSudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat.
2516.
3 Sudan Divestment Task Force, Divestment Statistics, http://sudandivestment.org/
statistics.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) [hereinafter SDTF Divestment Statistics].
4 Id.
5 SUDAN DIVESTMENT TASK FORCE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 3 (2008), available at
http://sudandivestment.org/docs/FAQs.pdf.
6 523 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
7 Id. at 750.
8 See SDTF Divestment Statistics, supra note 3.
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nois."' 9 Furthermore, President George W. Bush included a signing
statement with the bill indicating that the Executive Branch reserved
the power to interpret state divestment statutes to be unconstitu-
tional.10 President Bush's signing statement-together with a memo
from his Justice Department-outlines an argument that, notwith-
standing the SADA, the state divestment statutes may still be unconsti-
tutional. 1  Nonetheless, as this Note will explain, most state
divestment statutes withstand constitutional scrutiny under the
Supremacy Clause, 12 the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause,1 3 and
the Foreign Affairs Power,1 4 which all aim to protect the federal gov-
ernment's uniformity on foreign policy.
This Note examines the constitutionality of state divestment stat-
utes aimed at Sudan in light of the SADA's authorization, focusing on
the SDTF Model and Illinois' divestment statute. Part I provides a
background on Sudan and the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Part II dis-
cusses the divestment movement, state policy on Sudan, including the
SDTF Model legislation and Illinois' 2005 and 2007 statutes, and fed-
eral policy for Sudan. It also looks at the scope of the SADA's authori-
zation, concluding that while the SADA authorizes divestments under
the SDTF Model, it does not authorize the Illinois divestment scheme.
Part III examines the SADA's effect on the constitutionality of state
divestment statutes under the Supremacy Clause and the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause, concluding that the Illinois scheme is in-
valid under either analysis, but that the SDTF Model remains constitu-
tional. Part IV considers the constitutionality of the state divestment
statutes in light of the Foreign Affairs Power, analyzing the separation
and balance between Congress's and the Executive's power over For-
eign Affairs. This Part contends that the Illinois scheme violates the
Foreign Affairs Power, but that the SDTF Model does not. Finally, the
9 Kathleen Pender, Cutting Business Ties to Sudan, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 1, 2006, at Cl,
LexisNexis Academic (quoting William Reinsch, President, National Foreign Trade
Council).
10 See George W. Bush, U.S. President, Statement on Signing the Sudan Accountabil-
ity and Divestment Act of 2007, 43 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1646 (Dec. 31, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter President Bush's Statement].
11 See id.; Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen.,
to Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the U.S. (Oct. 26, 2007) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Justice Dep't Memo] ("[T]he bill purports to transfer [to] State and local
governments, in a way that raises both constitutional separation of powers and federalism
questions, foreign policy authority that the Constitution places, for very good reasons, with
the Federal government.").
12 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14 See generally Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 49-52 (1st Cir.
1999) (describing the constitutional basis for the foreign affairs power), affJd in result sub
nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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Note concludes by exploring the broader implications of the constitu-
tionality of state divestment statutes in light of the SADA.
I
BACKGROUND ON SUDAN AND THE PERSISTING CONFLICT
The conflict in Darfur, Sudan' 5 between African Muslim ethnic
groups and Arab Muslim inhabitants began in the 1930s and resur-
faced in the mid-1980s. 16 Ethnic tensions, drought, competition for
scarce resources, and a struggle for political power prompted armed
conflict between the two groups. 17 This armed conflict led to a civil
war, which began in February 2003 and included violence against gov-
ernment property and troops in Darfur. 18 In response, the Sudanese
government recruited, armed, and compensated the Arab militia,
known as the Janjaweed, to carry out an "ethnic cleansing" of the Afri-
can civilian population. 19
The conflict has cost the lives of approximately seventy thousand
civilians and has resulted in two million displaced persons, including
two-hundred thousand refugees who have fled to Chad.20 The Suda-
nese government initially justified its assistance to the Janjaweed by
citing a need to cease the rebellion.21 Not surprisingly, however, the
Sudanese government has distorted the reality of the situation. In
May 2006, an independent Sudanese government committee released
a report concluding that no genocide had occurred, rape was not
15 The Government of National Unity (GNU) governs Sudan, a poverty-stricken coun-
try divided by race and religion. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VOL. 16, No. 5(A), DARFUR IN
FLAMES: ATROCITIES IN WESTERN SUDAN, 1-2, 6-8 (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2004/sudan0404/sudan0404.pdf; CIA, THE 2008 WORLD FACTBOOK: SUDAN,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html (last visited
Jan. 5, 2009) [hereinafter CIA WORLD FACTBOOK]. "[T]he National Congress Party (NCP)
and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) formed a power-sharing government
under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement," which effectively ended the twenty-one
year civil war between the northern and southern regions of Sudan. CIA WORLD
FACTBOOK, supra; see Simon Roughneen, Sudan: Unresolved North-South Conflict Risks New Cri-
sis Beyond Darfur, WORLD POL. REV., June 28, 2007, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/
Article.aspx?id=892; BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, SUDAN: COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2004 (2005), http://www.
state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41628.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2009).
16 TED DAGNE & BATHSHEABA EVERETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CON-
GRESS ORDER CODE RL32643, SUDAN: THE DARFUR CRISIS AND THE STATUS OF THE NORTH-
SOUTH NEGOTIATIONS 1 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32643.pdf.
17 ld.
18 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 9.
19 See id. at 22-24.
20 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, supra notel5.
21 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT
AND MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN, § 5 (2004), available at http://hrw.org/en/node/
12133/section/1.
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widespread, and the number of deaths had been exaggerated. 22 The
international community rejected these conclusions, and the United
Nations Secretary-General called upon Sudan to take action on every
level of government to stop the violence in the region. 23 Feeling in-
ternational pressure to resolve the conflict, the Sudanese government,
the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and the Justice and Equality Move-
ment UJEM) signed a humanitarian ceasefire agreement on April 8,
2004.24 The agreement failed to create a timetable or structure to
monitor the efforts, so the Abuja Protocol of November 9, 2004 hoped
to address some of these concerns. 25 However, ceasefire violations
and the parties' continuous development of their military positions
prevented a peaceful resolution through these agreements. 26
Sudan's volatile political situation is closely linked to its economy.
Although Sudan's economy is stalked by drought, civil war, and global
competition,27 its development of an oil-export pipeline in 1999 in-
creased its crude oil exports and contributed to its now "booming"
economy.28 Increases in oil exportation since 1999 have led to in-
creases in Sudan's military budget; Sudan's President Omar AI-Bashir
stated, "'Just when some countries gave us sanctions, God gave us
oil." 29 The Sudanese government now spends approximately 80 per-
cent of its oil revenues on military expenditures. 30
22 See United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General S/2005/68,
1 13 (Feb. 4, 2005), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/229/
23/PDF/N0522923.pdf.
23 See id. 33-35.
24 See DAGNE & EVERETr, supra note 16, at 8.
25 Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan (GoS), The Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the En-
hancement of the Security Situation in Darfur in Accordance with the N'djamena Agree-
ment 1 (Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://www.unsudanig.org/ (search for "Protocol
Sudan Liberation Movement" and follow the first link) ("Expressing our utmost concern
over the repeated violations of the relevant provisions of the Humanitarian Ceasefire
Agreement ... and the prevailing insecurity in Darfur, notably the persistent attacks and
other abuses against civilians and their property and livelihood . . . ."). The protocol was
followed by a Declaration of Principles between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan Lib-
eration Movement, and the Justice and Equality Movement, which reaffirmed their com-
mitment to previous ceasefire resolutions and other peace agreements. Declaration of
Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur (July 6, 2005), available at
http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/sudan/darfur/declprinciplesjul05/pdf.
26 See United Nations Security Council, supra note 22, 35.
27 CIA WORLD FAcrBOOK, supra note 15.
28 Id.
29 SUDAN DIVESTMENT TASK FORCE, PETROCHINA, CNPC, & SUDAN: PERPETUATING GE-
NOCIDE, 4 (2007).
30 MICHAEL HOGAN, UNDERSTANDING SUDAN: FACT SHEET: CHINA & SUDAN, 2 (2007),
available at http://africa.berkely.edu/Sudan/Oil/China-SudanFactSheet2007.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2009).
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II
FEDERAL AND STATE POLICY IN THE SUDAN
DIVESTMENT MOVEMENT
Frustration with the national government's attempts to resolve
the conflict in Sudan 3 and a desire to prevent investment in compa-
nies that provide financial support for genocide 32 led to the Sudan
Divestment Movement, which aims to decrease investment in Sudan,
thus depriving the Sudanese government of funding for the geno-
cide. 33 A majority of U.S. states have shown support for the divest-
ment movement through the adoption or introduction of legislation
that mandates divestment in companies affiliated with Sudan.34 The
Sudan Divestment Task Force (SDTF) created a model for state divest-
ment statutes that balances the impact on the Sudanese government
with protecting Sudanese civilians. 35 Of the twenty-seven states that
have already adopted divestment legislation, nineteen have followed
the Sudan Divestment Task Force, model and eight have passed their
own state-specific statutes.3 6 Two other states have initiated Sudan-
divestment campaigns. 37 Historically, Sudan has been responsive to
economic pressure, and companies have already reacted to the move-
ment by ceasing operations in Sudan.38 Accordingly, Sudan's depen-
dence on foreign investment may promote peace in Sudan.39
31 Greg Miller & Josh Meyer, U.S. Relies on Sudan Despite Condemning It, L.A. TIMES,
June 11, 2007, at Al, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jun/ll/world/fg-us-
sudanil ("President Bush has denounced the killings in Sudan's western region as geno-
cide and has imposed sanctions on the government in Khartoum. But some critics say the
administration has soft-pedaled the sanctions to preserve its extensive intelligence collabo-
ration with Sudan."); see also LucienJ. Dhooge, Condemning Khartoum: The Illinois Divestment
Act and Foreign Relations, 43 Am. Bus. L.J. 245, 263 (2006).
32 See Sudan Divestment Task Force, http://www.sudandivestment.org/home.asp
(last visited Jan. 5, 2009) [hereinafter SDTF Homepage].
33 See id.
34 See infta notes 36-38 and accompanying text. The United States does not stand
alone in the divestment movement; eighteen other countries have also initiated Sudanese-
divestment campaigns. See SDTF Divestment Statistics, supra note 3.
35 See SDTF Homepage, supra note 32.
36 SDTF Divestment Statistics, supra note 3. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Vermont
have adopted the SDTF Model Legislation. Id. Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Ma-
ryland, Missouri, New Jersey, and Oregon have adopted their own models. Id.
37 See id.
38 See SDTF Homepage, supra note 32. Companies including La Mancha Resources,
CHC Helicopter, Siemens, Rolls Royce, ICSA of India, Weatherford International, Weir
Group, and Schlumberger have ceased (or plan to cease) doing business in Sudan or have
significantly changed their behavior in the country. See SDTF Divestment Statistics, supra
note 3.
39 See SDTF Homepage, supra note 32. Several of the companies that ceased opera-
tions in Sudan have acknowledged the influence of the Sudanese divestment movement
upon their actions, though others have mentioned "humanitarian," "political," and even
"moral" concerns related to Sudan. SDTF Divestment Statistics, supra note 3.
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The majority of U.S. states have adopted some form of the SDTF
Model, while others, including Illinois, have taken their own ap-
proach. Illinois' model, compared to the SDTF Model, mandates di-
vestment in more cases, has fewer exceptions, and affects more
companies. The federal government's authorization under the SADA
does not provide a blanket authorization for these state divestment
statutes. This Part explains that the SADA authorizes divestment legis-
lation under the SDTF Model but does not authorize Illinois' state
divestment scheme.
A. State Policy on Sudan Divestment
1. The Sudan Divestment Task Force Model
The Genocide Intervention Network (GIN) is working with the
SDTF to facilitate the Sudan divestment movement. 40 The SDTF de-
signed the SDTF Model statute to "maximize impact on the Sudanese
government, while minimizing potential harm to both innocent Suda-
nese civilians and investment returns." 41 The sample legislation man-
dates divestment of state pension funds and other affected assets from
certain companies. 42 Generally, the SDTF Model concentrates on
state pension funds investing in the worst of offending companies, de-
fined as companies with these three characteristics: "1. Have a busi-
ness relationship with the government or government-created project,
2. Impart minimal benefit to the country's underprivileged, and 3.
Have demonstrated no substantial corporate governance policy re-
garding the Darfur situation. ' 43 The SDTF Model only requires di-
vestment from an offending company if that company does not
change its behavior. 44 Finally, the Model has exceptions, which allow
investment in companies, industries, and regions that benefit
civilians.45
The SDTF Model requires state-run funds to identify "Scrutinized
Companies" and in some cases mandates divestment from these com-
panies.46 "Scrutinized Companies" include those that (1) contract di-
rectly with the government of Sudan or are involved in government-
40 See SDTF Homepage, supra note 32.
41 Id. Cooley Godward Kronish LLP is the pro bono legal counsel for this project.
Sudan Divestment Task Force, Task Force Reports (2007), http://www.sudandivestment.org/
position.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2009). For the text of the model legislation, see TARGETED
SUDAN DIVESTMENT: MODEL LEGISLATION (Sudan Divestment Task Force 2008), available at
http://sudandivestment.org/docs/taskforcetargeted divestment-model.pdf.
42 TARGETED SUDAN DIVESTMENT: MODEL LEGISLATION §§ l(t), 2(n).
43 See Sudan Divestment Task Force, supra note 41.
44 See id. ("The targeted model only requires divestment from companies that are un-
responsive to an expedited person of shareholder engagement."); TARGETED SUDAN DIVEST-
MENT: MODEL LEGISLATION § 4(a)(4).
45 TARGETED SUDAN DIVESTMENT: MODEL LEGISLATION § 2(o), (p).
46 See id. § 4(a)-(b).
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commissioned projects, and whose company revenue or assets are
linked to oil-related activities, mineral extracting activities, or power
production activities that have failed to take "Substantial Action; '" 4 7
(2) supply military equipment in Sudan;48 or (3) are complicit in the
Darfur genocide. 49 A company can avoid divestment by taking "Sub-
stantial Action," which requires creating a plan to cease scrutinized
business operations within one year.50 Scrutinized companies do not
include "Social Development Companies," which are companies that
provide humanitarian, medicinal, or educational services. 51
Once a state fund identifies a "Scrutinized Company," it must be-
gin "engagement," which requires identifying the company, sending a
written warning that it may be subject to divestment, and encouraging
the company to cease the scrutinized operations. 52 If the company
ceases its scrutinized business operations within ninety days of initial
notification to the company, then the state removes the company
from the "Scrutinized Company" list.53 Alternatively, if the company
does not cease the operations, the state pension fund must divest itself
of all publicly traded securities of that company.54
The SDTF Model is carefully limited in scope and application.
For example, it applies to companies engaged in scrutinized activity
with the government in Khartoum, Sudan, but not to the regional gov-
ernment in southern Sudan.55 Also, the definition of "Public Funds"
includes only state pension fund systems and other affected assets, 56
and mandatory divestment is not required for the public funds' indi-
rect holdings in actively managed investment funds, which include
private equity funds.57 Additionally, the SDTF Model expires when
Congress or the President declares either that the genocide has
ceased for at least twelve months or that the Sudanese government
has honored its commitments to end the genocide, the United States
withdraws all sanctions against the Sudanese government, or further
legislation or an executive order declare that divestment is in conflict
with U.S. foreign policy.58 In fact, the legislation remains in effect
only as long as it is "consistent with, and does not unduly interfere
47 Id. § 2(o)(1)(i).
48 Id. § 2(o)(3).
49 Id. § 2 (o) (2).
50 See id. § 2(q).
51 Id. § 2(p).
52 Id. § 4(a)(1)-(2).
53 Id. § 4(a)(3)-(4).
54 Id. § 4(a)(4), (b).
55 Id- § 2 (f).
56 Id. § 2(n).
57 Id. § 4(e).
58 Id. §6.
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with, the foreign policy of the United States." 59 The SDTF Model also
includes a severability clause, stating that if any particular portion is
found to be "invalid, illegal, unenforceable or unconstitutional," that
particular clause can be severed and the rest of the legislation will
remain operative. 60
2. The Illinois Sudan Act
Illinois adopted its own mandatory divestment statute in 2005,
the Illinois Sudan Act (2005 Illinois Act), or the "Act to End Atrocities
and Terrorism in the Sudan," which consisted of two parts, the De-
posit of State Moneys Act (2005 Illinois Moneys Act) and the Illinois
Pension Code (2005 Illinois Pension Act) .61 The 2005 Illinois Moneys
Act mandated divestment of the state treasurer's investments for all
companies doing business with or in Sudan; the 2005 Illinois Pension
Act mandated divestments for the entire Illinois pension system in all
companies with ties to Sudan.62 In February 2007, an Illinois district
court held in NFTTC v. Giannoulias that the 2005 Illinois Act was uncon-
stitutional.63 Rather than strike down the 2005 Illinois Act as per se
unconstitutional, the court specified boundaries for Sudan divestment
statutes that Illinois had crossed.64
The Illinois legislature responded by amending the 2005 Illinois
Sudan Act and in 2007 signed into law an amended Illinois Sudan Act
(2007 Illinois Act). Like the 2005 Illinois Act, the 2007 Illinois Act has
two sections. The first section, the amended Deposit of State Moneys
Act (2007 Illinois Moneys Act) mandates that the state treasurer divest
from a narrower range of companies than the 2005 Illinois Moneys
Act required. 65 Second, the amended Illinois Pension Code (2007 Illi-
nois Pension Act) does not apply to the entire pension system and
mandates that these more-limited state pension funds divest from a
narrower range of companies. 6 6
59 Id. § I(s).
60 Id. § 10.
61 Deposit of State Moneys Act, 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 520/0.01 to 520/23 (West
2008), amended by Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan, Ill. Pub. Act No. 094-
0079 (2006); Illinois Pension Code, 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 to 5/1-120 (2007),
amended by Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan, Ill. Pub. Act No. 094-0079
(2006). Note that much of the language of the Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the
Sudan was repealed by Il. Pub. Act 094-0079.
62 See generally sources cited supra note 61.
63 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
64 See id.
65 See 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/0.01 (2007).
66 See 40 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/1-101.
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a. Giannoulias and the Illinois Sudan Act of 2005
In NFTC v. Giannoulias, the National Foreign Trade Council
(NFTC), along with municipal pension funds in Illinois and public
pension fund beneficiaries, brought a federal action against Illinois
officials challenging the legality of the 2005 Illinois Act.6 7 The case
was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, which held the act unconstitutional and permanently en-
joined the defendants from enforcing it.68 The court reasoned that
the 2005 Illinois Moneys Act violated the Supremacy Clause and the
Foreign Affairs Power,69 and that the 2005 Illinois Pension Act vio-
lated the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. 7
0
Giannoulias held that the first part of the 2005 Illinois Act, the
2005 Moneys Act, violated the Supremacy Clause because it conflicted
with then-existing Federal law, 71 which did not yet include the
SADA.7 2 The 2005 Moneys Act mandated divestment of state-backed
government bonds in Sudan and investments in certain "forbidden
entit[ies]. ' ' 73 The court noted differences between the 2005 Illinois
Moneys Act and federal policy and ultimately opined that the "lack of
flexibility, extended geographic reach, and impact on foreign entities
interferes with the national government's conduct of foreign af-
fairs." 74 First, the 2005 Illinois Moneys Act did not contain provisions
allowing for suspension or non-enforcement of the act and instead
remained effective as long as Executive Order 13,06775 was in place.76
Second, the 2005 Illinois Moneys Act applied to foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. companies, though existing federal law did not.7 7 Third, the
2005 Illinois Moneys Act applied to the entire Republic of Sudan, but
federal law excludes various areas, such as southern Sudan.7 8 Fourth,
the 2005 Illinois Moneys Act maintained a rather broad definition of a
"forbidden entity," which encompasses any company that the govern-
ment of Sudan partially manages, 79 companies that do not certify
under oath that they do not have ties to Sudan, 80 and includes any
67 See Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731.
68 See id. at 751.
69 See id. at 741-42, 745.
70 See id. at 750. See infra Parts III & IV for further discussion of the Court's analysis.
71 Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 741-42 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
72 SeeSudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat.
2516.
73 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.5(2.5), (7) (2007).
74 Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 741-42.
75 For a discussion of Executive Order 13,067, see infra notes 104-06 and accompany-
ing text.
76 See Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6(b)(2) (2007).
80 See id. 22.6(b) (5).
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company providing equipment or services to Sudan."' In contrast,
federal law more narrowly defined restricted companies; for example,
by allowing non-lethal military equipment into southern Sudan.82 Fi-
nally, in contrast to the Illinois Sudan Act, federal policy regarding
Sudan left much discretion to the President to determine when to
impose sanctions.8 3
The court also found that the 2005 Illinois Moneys Act violated
the Foreign Affairs Power by hindering the President's ability to speak
with "one voice" in matters of national affairs and that Illinois had
taken a "different track from the one embodied in the federal pol-
icy."' 84 Similar to its Supremacy Clause analysis, the court found prob-
lematic the Illinois statute's inflexibility and geographic reach. 85 The
court did concede that although the act is inflexible, "it may be a
stretch to say that the Act uses an iron fist where the national Sudan
policy uses kid gloves," as the Supreme Court had previously said of a
California law.8 6 Furthermore, the court maintained that the Illinois
statute had an actual impact on the federal government's implementa-
tion of foreign policy.8 7 The act had already caused non-compliant
banks to lose $275 million, forcing banks to deny loan applications
from companies doing business in Sudan and forcing bank customers
to choose between business with the bank and business in Sudan.88
The second part of the 2005 Illinois Act, the 2005 Illinois Pension
Act, prohibited retirement systems from investing in companies with
business in Sudan.89 Under this Act, pension funds included more
than just state funds; for example, the statute also prevented munici-
pal pension funds from investing in Sudanese companies. 90 Lastly,
the district court held that the 2005 Illinois Pension Act violated the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.91 The 2005 Illinois Pension Act
burdened foreign commerce by limiting banks and corporations from
conducting business with companies tied to Sudan.92 The court re-
jected Illinois' argument that foreign commerce was "not implicated
because a bank can forego accepting money from the state or a corpo-
81 See Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 741 ("Congress gave the president broad leeway to impose, or decide not
to impose, an array of sanctions. The Illinois Sudan Act, however, does not allow for such
flexibility. It does not allow for a temporary suspension of sanctions or a specific waiver,
even if the president deemed such an action to be in the national interest.").
84 Id. at 744.
85 See id. at 741-42.
86 See id. at 744.
87 See id. at 745.
88 See id. at 746.
89 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(a) (2007).
90 See id.; Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 734.
91 Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 747-50.
92 See id. at 747.
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ration can forego having pension funds own its securities." 93 Never-
theless, the court left open the possibility that a narrower amendment
to the 2005 Illinois Pension Code could be constitutional.94
b. The 2007 Illinois Sudan Act
After the Giannoulias decision, Illinois amended the 2005 Illinois
Act, which resulted in the 2007 Illinois Moneys Act 95 and the 2007
Illinois Pension Act.96 Geographically, the 2007 Illinois Act still ap-
plies to investments in the Republic of Sudan and to companies doing
business in the Republic of Sudan.9 7 Yet, the 2007 Act did make sev-
eral changes to the 2005 Illinois Act. For one, the 2007 Act elimi-
nated the procurement clause, 98 so although the previous Act applied
to state contracts and investments, the 2007 Illinois Act does not apply
to state contracts. Also, the 2007 Illinois Act only applies to five state
pension funds or retirement systems and allows companies time to
comply with its requirements before divestment occurs. 99
"Forbidden entities," companies in which the Illinois Treasurer
and pension funds may not invest, generally include publicly traded
companies that independent research firms identify as owning or con-
trolling assets, having distribution agreements with, issuing credits or
loans to, or providing or receiving goods and services to the Republic
of Sudan or companies domiciled in Sudan.' 00 It also includes private
market funds that fail to certify that they do not conduct transactions
with Sudan. 101
Lastly, the 2007 Illinois Act includes a clause that maintains its
effectiveness so long as federal statutes or executive orders authorize
sanctions'0 2 and includes a severability clause stating that if any provi-
sion in the Act is held invalid, the valid portions of the Act remain
unaffected, 10 3
93 See id.
94 See id. at 750 n.5.
95 15 ILL. COMp. STAT. 520/0.01 (2007).
96 40 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/1-101. The 2007 Illinois Act makes it unlikely that Giannou-
//as will be directly appealed because the holding applied to the 2005 Illinois Act. See Illi-
nois Venture Capital Association, Illinois Sudan Divestment Legislation, http://www.illinoisvc.
org/pages/sudan act/68.php (last visited Jan. 5, 2009).
97 See 40 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.6 (a)(1).
98 Cf 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6 ("[T]he State Treasurer shall not deposit any
funds into or otherwise contract with any financial institutions .... ."). 15 ILL. COMP. STAT.
520/22.6 (2007) (repealing Section 22.6 of the 2005 Act).
99 Illinois Venture Capital Association, supra note 96.
100 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.6(b).
101 See id.
102 See id. 5/1-110.6(i).
103 See id. 5/1-110.5.
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B. Federal Policy on Sudan
The SADA was not the first action taken by the United States to
demonstrate its disapproval of the Sudanese government. In response
to Sudan's involvement in international terrorism and its human
rights violations, President William J. Clinton issued an Executive Or-
der1 0 4 in 1997 to counter Sudan's threat to national security. The Ex-
ecutive Order blocked access to the United States for all property of
the Sudanese government that was in U.S. control.'0 5 The Executive
Order generally prohibits the following: (a) imports from Sudan to
the United States, (b) exports to Sudan from the United States, (c)
facilitation by a U.S. person of exports from Sudan, (d) the perform-
ance of a contract in support of certain projects in Sudan, (e) grant-
ing extensions of credit or loans by any U.S. person to the Sudanese
government, (f) transactions relating to the transportation of cargo to
or from the United States by a Sudanese person, and (g) transactions
that intend to evade the above prohibitions.1 0 6
Congress has also acted in response to the Sudanese genocide.
The Sudan Peace Act in 2002 gave the President additional authority
to use all means of pressure to help resolve the war in Sudan, includ-
ing the denial of oil revenue to the Sudanese government.'0 7 In 2004,
Congress passed the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, giving the
President additional authority to impose sanctions.1 08 Finally, in
2006, Congress passed the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act
(DPAA), which, among other things, authorized the President to pro-
vide assistance to the African Union Mission in Sudan and denied en-
try of certain ships to U.S. ports in an effort to deprive Sudan of oil
revenue. 
109
1. Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007
The Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007
(SADA), 110 enacted on December 31, 2007, is an act "[t]o authorize
State and local governments to divest assets in companies that con-
104 See Exec. Order No. 13,067, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1997), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701
(2006). Although the Executive Order was set to last for only one year, both Presidents
Clinton and Bush annually extended it so that it has not lapsed. For the most recent
continuation, see Notice of President of the United States, 72 Fed. Reg. 62,407 (Nov. 3,
2007).
105 See Exec. Order No. 13,067, § 1.
106 See id. § 2.
107 Sudan Peace Act, Pub. L. No. 107-245, § 6(b)(2), 116 Stat. 1504, 1508 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701).
108 Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-497, 118 Stat. 4012
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701).
109 See Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-344 § 6(e), 120
Stat. 1869, 1877 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701).
110 Pub. L. No. 110-174, pmbl., 121 Stat. 2516, 2516 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701).
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duct business operations in Sudan, [and] to prohibit United States
Government contracts with such companies." ' ' States acting under
this specific authority are explicitly "not preempted by any Federal law
or regulation."'"12 As Senator Christopher Dodd expressed, the act
"allows divestment to take place in a unitary, federally sanctioned
manner."
1 3
The SADA specifies the scope of authorized state divestment,
which includes divesting state assets from and prohibiting state invest-
ment in business operations in Sudan related to "power production
activities, mineral extraction activities, oil-related activities, or the pro-
duction of military equipment."11 4 The act, however, does create ex-
ceptions. For example, it permits investment in businesses that
operate with the government in southern Sudan or provide goods to
"marginalized populations"; the act also permits investment in
peacekeeping or humanitarian organizations or those that promote
health or education.11 5 The SADA places the following restrictions on
states' mandatory divestment: (1) the state must provide written no-
tice to companies, (2) the state may not divest until 90 days after the
notice, (3) the measure must not apply to companies with no direct
investments in prohibited business operations, and (4) the state
should make an effort to avoid incorrect divestitures.' 1 6
President George W. Bush signed the bill, but included a signing
statement that the legislation "risks being interpreted as insulating
from Federal oversight State and local divestment actions .... How-
ever, . . . the executive branch shall construe and enforce this legisla-
tion in a manner that does not conflict with [the President's authority
over foreign affairs]. 'u"17 In effect, the President was attempting to
stamp onto the statute his interpretation that the statute was subject to
the Executive Branch's enforcement of the legislation.
2. The Scope of the SADA's Authorization
The SADA is best read to authorize state divestment under the
Sudan Divestment Task Force Model but not as authorizing divest-
ment under the 2007 Illinois Act. The SADA explicitly authorizes
state activity that meets four requirements: (1) the state or local gov-
ernment provides notice to the company, (2) divestment occurs 90
111 Id.
112 Id. § 3(g).
113 153 Cong. Rec. S15,374 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
114 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 § 3(d) (1), 121 Stat. at 2518.
115 See id. § 3(d) (2), 121 Stat. at 2518. The Act also provides exceptions for business
operations with a license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control and business opera-
tions voluntarily suspended. See id.
116 See id. § 3(e), 121 Stat. at 2519.
117 President Bush's Statement, supra note 10.
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days after the written notice is provided, (3) divestment does not ap-
ply to companies that have demonstrated they do not have business
operations in Sudan, and (4) the state does not adopt divestment
measures unless they have direct investment in power production ac-
tivities, mineral extraction activities, oil-related activities, or the pro-
duction of military equipment.'1 8 States must also have exceptions to
allow investment in companies contracting with southern Sudan, pro-
viding goods to humanitarian organizations, and providing goods pro-
moting health or education.11 9
States that have adopted the SDTF Model fall within the scope of
the SADA's requirements for permissible divestment statutes. The
SDTF Model meets these four requirements. It requires a written no-
tice to companies possibly subject to divestment, 120 does not mandate
divestment until 90 days after notifying the company,1 21 and provides
companies the opportunity to cease its business with Sudan.1 22 Fi-
nally, just as the SADA narrowly defines prohibited business opera-
tions to four activities, 123 the SDTF Model similarly does not prohibit
investments in all business operations but restricts investment to
power production activities, mineral extraction activities, oil-related
activities, or the production of military equipment. 124
Moreover, the SADA requires an exception for the southern re-
gion of Sudan, 25 and the SDTF Model's definition of the Sudanese
government "does not include the regional government of southern
Sudan."' 26 Like the SADA, 127 the SDTF Model creates an exception
and does not mandate state public-fund divestment for social develop-
ment companies that provide humanitarian aid or benefit marginal-
ized populations of Sudan. 128
In contrast, the SADA does not authorize the 2007 Illinois Act
because although the 2007 Illinois Act meets some of the SADA's re-
quirements, it still reaches a broader range of companies than the
SADA's scope permits. The 2007 Illinois Act does comply with several
of the SADA's requirements. For example, it imposes geographic re-
118 See id. § 3(d)(1), (e), 121 Stat. at 2518-19.
119 See id. § 3(d), 121 Stat. at 2518-19.
120 TARGETED SUDAN DIVESTMENT: MODEL LEGISLATION § 4(a) (2) (Sudan Divestment
Task Force 2008).
121 See id. § 4(a) (4).
122 See id. §4(a)(3).
123 See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 § 3 (d), 121 Stat. at 2518.
124 TARGETED SUDAN DIVESTMENT: MODEL LEGISLATION § 2(o).
125 See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 § 3(d) (2) (A), 121 Stat. at
2518.
126 TARGETED SUDAN DIVESTMENT: MODEL LEGISLATION § 2(f).
127 See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 § 3(d) (2) (E), 121 Stat. at
2518.
128 TARGETED SUDAN DIVESTMENT: MODEL LEGISLATION. § 2(p), (q).
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strictions on its divestment provisions, requiring divestment only from
companies investing in "those geographic areas of the Republic of Su-
dan that are subject to sanction . . . imposed by the United States
Government."' 29 Additionally, like the SADA, Illinois excluded from
its definition of forbidden activity investments in humanitarian orga-
nizations or those intended to relieve human suffering. - 0 The 2007
Illinois Act does, however, fail the SADA's requirement that states re-
strict divestment to companies investing in power production, mineral
extraction, oil development, or the production of military equip-
ment.131 Instead, forbidden entities under the 2007 Illinois Act con-
sist of "any company" engaging in activity that Illinois prohibits. 3 2
III
CONGRESS'S POWER AND DIVESTMENT STATUTES: THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND THE DORMANT FOREIGN
COMMERCE CLAUSE
State laws affecting foreign affairs can violate the Supremacy
Clause and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. If Congress has
affirmatively spoken and state law conflicts with federal law, then the
Supremacy Clause invalidates the state law. Alternatively, if Congress
has not directly spoken to an area of foreign affairs that deals with
foreign commerce with other nations, then the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause can invalidate the state law if it impermissibly bur-
dens foreign commerce and affects the nation's ability to speak with
one voice in foreign affairs. Under either analysis, if Congress autho-
rizes the particular state action, then the state law is valid.
In this case, the SADA reflects Congress's affirmative action in the
area of Sudan state divestment statutes. The 2007 Illinois Act conflicts
with the SADA, and is thus preempted under the Supremacy Clause.
However, even if the SADA does not speak to the Illinois divestment
scheme and thus does not preempt it, the 2007 Illinois Act is still
unconstitutional under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. The
SDTF Model is constitutional under both the Supremacy Clause and
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause because the SADA specifically
authorizes state action under the Model.
129 40 ILL. COMP. STAr. 5/1-110.6(b) (2007).
130 See id.
131 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 § 3(d), 121 Stat. at 2518.
132 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.6(b).
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A. The Supremacy Clause
State laws that conflict with federal laws are preempted under the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 133 Preemption can occur
in any of the following three circumstances: (1) if Congress expressly
preempts state law, (2) if Congress implicitly preempts state law by
occupying a field, and (3) if state law conflicts with federal law.134 In
general, to determine whether a state law is preempted, the "funda-
mental inquiry . . . is whether Congress intended to displace state
law."1 35 Alternatively, the state law is not preempted if Congress has
spoken to and authorized the state action.' 3 6
In the second category, a state law is preempted if it is inconsis-
tent with the federal law's objectives and undermines uniformity in
foreign affairs.' 3 7 A state law that is "in concurrence" with an area in
which the federal government has legislated does not lead to preemp-
tion. 138 Implied preemption should not operate as a restriction on
states to legislate in areas traditionally left to the states.1 39 In Lodge 76
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, the Supreme Court held
that the National Labor Relations Act did not preempt state action in
"peripheral" areas of labor law because the federal act left much to
the states and labor relations were traditionally regulated by the
states. 140 The mere existence of a federal statute in a field of law does
not automatically preempt any state law in that field. However, if Con-
gress has addressed a particular subject matter, the state law is not in
accord with federal law if it "'go [es] farther than Congress has seen fit
133 U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."); see Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000).
134 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the three cate-
gories of preemption are not "'rigidly distinct."' Id. at 372 n.6 (citations omitted).
135 Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 6 (1986). Compare Crosby,
530 U.S. at 368-70, 373-74 (holding that the Massachusetts Burma Law conflicted with
federal policy and was thus preempted, reasoning that the Massachusetts law "under-
mine[d] the intended purpose and 'natural effect"' of existing federal law), with Bd. of
Trs. v. Mayor & City Council of Bat., 317 Md. 72, 131 (1989) (upholding a city ordinance
requiring city pension funds to divest from companies doing business with South Africa,
reasoning, in part, that the traditional prerogative of state and local governments to regu-
late pension funds creates a presumption against preemption). The federal statute's dele-
gation of discretion to the President in sanctioning Burma, its more limited scope than
state law, and its express provision for the President's authority in developing a multilateral
strategy particularly impressed the Crosby Court. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373-74.
136 See Wardair, 477 U.S. at 7.
137 See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 115 (2000).
138 See id.
139 See Lodge 76 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 136 (1976).
140 Id.
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to go.' 1 4 1 United States v. Locke held that a state law was preempted
because it imposed more stringent language-proficiency tests on vessel
operators than the federal government did.142 In the third category,
state law "conflicts" with federal law if adherence to the state law
would either make it impossible to follow federal law or create an ob-
stacle to following federal law. 143
1. The 2007 Illinois Act Violates the Supremacy Clause
The 2007 Illinois Act violates the Supremacy Clause because it
conflicts with the SADA. The Supremacy Clause analysis applies be-
cause Congress has spoken about states' Sudan divestment statutes.
The SADA demonstrates a congressional intention to occupy the field
of Sudan divestment policy. Thus, the SADA and the other previous
federal acts related to Sudan preempt Illinois' divestment scheme.
The SADA gives a clear, explicit statement that Congress authorizes a
particular type of state divestment activity:
[A] State or local government may adopt and enforce measures that
meet the requirements of [the SADA] to divest the assets of the
State or local government from, or prohibit investment of the assets
of the State or local government in, persons that the State or local
government determines ... are conducting or having direct invest-
ments in [certain] business operations [in Sudan]." 4 4
As stated above, Congress's grant of divestment authority is subject to
certain requirements. Among these requirements is that states man-
date divestment only for power production activities, mineral extrac-
tion activities, oil-related activities, or the production of military
equipment. 145
The 2007 Illinois Act is preempted because Congress has spoken
and Illinois legislated beyond what the SADA authorized. The 2007
Illinois Act mandates divestment in all companies with certain busi-
ness in or with Sudan.' 46 Furthermore, the SADA excludes certain
141 Id.; see Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
142 See Locke, 529 U.S. at 112-16.
143 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372-73. Some courts separate preemption into "field pre-
emption" and "conflict preemption." See generally 81A C.J.S. States § 49 (2004 & Supp.
2008) (describing the scope of federal preemption of state laws) (citing Bankwest, Inc. v.
Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004)). "Field preemption" refers to the second
case of preemption, when Congress intends to occupy an entire field, leaving no room for
states to legislate. See Bankwest, 324 U.S. at 1345. "Conflict preemption" refers to the third
case of preemption, cases in which one cannot comply with both federal and state law or
compliance with state law creates an obstacle in complying with federal law. See id.
144 See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, § 3(b),
121 Stat. 2516, 2518 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)).
145 See id. § 3(d)(1), 121 Stat. at 2518.
146 See 40 ILL. CoNIP. STAT. 5/1-110.6(b) (2007) (defining a "'Company'" as "any entity
capable of affecting commerce").
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regions from its divestment policy, including southern Sudan, 147 while
the 2007 Illinois Act applies to the Republic of Sudan as a whole.1 48
The Supreme Court dealt with a similar conflict in Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council, reasoning that the Massachusetts "statute con-
flict[ed] with federal law . .. by penalizing individuals and conduct
that Congress has explicitly exempted or excluded from sanctions. '1 49
Massachusetts had imposed economic pressure on Burma through re-
strictions on state contracts with companies doing business in Burma.
The federal government had also directed sanctions at Burma but lim-
ited economic pressure in a way that the state law had not.150 Simi-
larly, the 2007 Illinois Act penalizes conduct for certain industries and
geographical regions that the SADA explicitly excepts.
Additionally, like Crosby, a conflict exists here even though the
federal and state statutes "share the same goals and ... some compa-
nies may comply with both sets of restrictions." 151 Congress's goal in
enacting the SADA is to prevent Sudan from using its financial deal-
ings to facilitate genocide. 152 Likewise, the 2007 Illinois Act was legis-
lated in an effort to prevent the Sudanese government from using
funds from forbidden entities to commit genocide and terrorism.' 53
Yet, as Crosby noted, these similar aims are not enough to prevent
preemption.
Both parts of the 2007 Illinois Act, the 2007 Illinois Moneys Act
and the 2007 Illinois Pension Act, violate the Supremacy Clause. The
2007 Illinois Moneys Act conflicts with federal law, the SADA, as dis-
cussed above, by broadly covering geographical regions of Sudan that
the SADA does not cover and by mandating divestment for industries
that the SADA explicitly excludes. Even the district court in Giannou-
lias reasoned that these factors created a conflict between the 2005
Illinois Moneys Act and federal law,1 54 which at the time did not in-
clude the SADA. With the introduction of the SADA into federal law,
the argument for preemption is even stronger. Congress has expan-
sively addressed this area of law by authorizing certain state divest-
ments and clearly asserting that state legislation that meets these
requirements "is not preempted by any Federal law or regulation." 155
147 See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 § 3(d) (2) (A), 121 Stat. at
2518.
148 See 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.6 (a)(1).
149 530 U.S. 363, 378 (2000).
150 Id. at 376.
151 See id. at 379.
152 See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 § 7, 121 Stat. at 2522.
153 See 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1.
154 See supra Part II.A.2(a).
155 See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 § 3(f) (2) (A), 121 Stat. at
2519.
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The 2007 Illinois Pension Act also violates the Supremacy Clause
because it conflicts with federal law, the SADA. Prior to the SADA, no
federal law directly preempted pension fund investments.156 Giannou-
lias held that the 2005 Illinois Pension Act did not violate the
Supremacy Clause (although it did hold that it violated the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause) because no federal law mandated divest-
ment of holdings in Sudan. 157 Now, with the introduction of the
SADA, federal law gives direct, unambiguous directions about which
companies a state may permissibly require state pension funds to
divest.158 As discussed above, the 2007 Illinois Pension Act exceeds
this federal authorization by mandating divestments in various cases
in which federal law does not mandate divestment. Thus, the 2007
Illinois Pension Act is in direct conflict with federal law.
2. The SDTF Model Does Not Violate the Supremacy Clause
The SADA does authorize the SDTF Model, 159 thus the SDTF
Model does not violate the Supremacy Clause. Federal statutory au-
thorization of state activity suggests that such state activity is not pre-
empted under the Supremacy Clause.' 6°1 For example, in Wardair
Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, the Supreme Court up-
held a Florida state law against a preemption challenge brought
under the Federal Aviation Act, reasoning that because Congress
seemed to "invite [ ]" the state action, it was "not the stuff of pre-emp-
tion."' 61 In that case, the federal act had "expressly permit[ted]"
states to legislate the taxes that were in question.162
Here, Congress also expressly permitted states to legislate on Su-
dan divestment, so long as they met the SADA's requirements. The
SDTF Model's satisfaction of those requirements is then activity in-
vited, not preempted, by Congress. Preemption analysis under the
Supremacy Clause looks to Congress's intent,163 and the SADA's au-
thorization of the SDTF Model is a clear indication of Congress's in-
tent not to preempt all state activity in this area. 164 Indeed, the SADA
156 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 742 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
157 See id.
158 SeeSudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 § 3(f) (2) (A), 121 Stat. at 2519
("[T]he term 'assets' refers to public monies and includes any pension, retirement, annu-
ity, or endowment fund, or similar instrument, that is controlled by a State or local govern-
ment."); id § 3(e), 121 Stat. at 2519 ("Any measure taken by a State or local government...
shall meet [certain] requirements.").
159 See supra Part III.A.
160 See Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7 (1986).
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 See id. at 6.
164 See id. at 7 (asserting that state regulation is not preempted if Congress "expressly
and unequivocally" invites it).
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includes explicit language that "[a] measure of a State or local govern-
ment authorized under [this Act] is not preempted by any Federal law or
regulation."165 Moreover, the Justice Department under President
George W. Bush conceded that the SADA may alleviate federal pre-
emption concerns about state divestment statutes. 166
B. The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress
power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States."' 67 This affirmative allocation of power to the federal
government restrains the states' ability to regulate interstate and for-
eign commerce. 168 Under this so-called dormant Commerce Clause,
state action that facially discriminates against interstate or foreign
commerce is subject to strict scrutiny.1 69 In such cases, the state ac-
tion is valid only if the state has a legitimate purpose that it cannot
otherwise achieve through non-discriminatory means. 170 The dor-
mant Commerce Clause seeks to prevent states from "'jeopardizing
the welfare of the Nation as a whole' by 'plac[ing] burdens on the
flow of commerce.' "171 If foreign, rather than interstate, commerce is
implicated, an additional consideration exists: that state regulation of
foreign commerce does not impede the nation's ability to speak with
"'one voice"' in foreign policy.' 72
States do not violate the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause if
Congress affirmatively authorizes such state action. The dormant For-
eign Commerce Clause bars states from acting in areas of foreign
commerce where Congress has remained silent.173 When the "actions
taken by the federal government accept the authority of States,' 74 or
165 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, § 3(g), 121
Stat. 2516, 2519 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)) (emphasis added).
166 Justice Dep't Memo, supra note 11, at 3.
167 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
168 See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
169 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
170 See id. Cf Pike v. Bruce, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (noting that in a dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis, if the state statute's "effects on interstate commerce are only inci-
dental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits").
171 Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005) (quot-
ing Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995)).
172 SeeJapan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (quoting Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
173 Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
174 Id. at 9. In Wardair, The Federal Aviation Act made permissible "sales or use taxes
on the sale of goods or services" for air commerce. Id. at 8. Congress had spoken on the
issue through this Act, which took particular air commerce taxes out of the dormant For-
eign Commerce Clause analysis. See id. at 9. The Court went further, noting that other
forms of federal government action, such as foreign contracts indicating acquiescence to
the state tax policy could constitute congressional action. See id. at 9-10. Instead the Flor-
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authorize it, the nation is still speaking with "one voice" and the pur-
pose behind the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause is still
respected. 175 A long-held constitutional principle provides that Con-
gress may grant states power over commerce, even in instances in
which state action would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.' 76 In Wardair, the Federal Aviation Act expressly permitted
states to impose taxes, such as the Florida sales tax, which then did not
violate the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. 177 Rather, Wardair
was an instance in which Congress affirmatively acted and was not a
case of "governmental silence of the sort that triggers dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis."' 1 78
In cases in which the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause applies
(i.e., Congress has not affirmatively acted on the issue), the market
participation doctrine may shield state activity from violating the dor-
mant Foreign Commerce Clause. 179 The exception applies in cases
where the state is acting as a private participant in the market.180 To
determine whether the state is acting as a market participant, rather
than as a market regulator, the inquiry is whether the challenged ac-
tivity constitutes direct or local participation in the market.i8 ' For ex-
ample, in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, the market participation doctrine
applied to South Dakota's sale of cement because the state was selling
cement from its own state plants to its own citizens. 182 The Supreme
Court rationalized that if a state is acting as a private market partici-
pant, a state should not be subject to dormant Commerce Clause limi-
tations and should have the freedom to favor its own citizens.' 8 3 In
contrast, if a state is acting as a market regulator, the market participa-
ida tax did not violate the Supremacy Clause because, although the Act "regulated aviation
extensively," Congress did not intend to preempt; the Act instead expressly invited the
activity. See id. at 6.
175 See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451 (quoting Michelin Tire Cop., 423 U.S. at 285) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see also S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,
92 (1984) ("[W]hen Congress acts, all segments of the country are represented .... ").
176 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945) ("Congress has un-
doubted power to redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce.").
177 See Wardair 477 U.S. at 6-7, 9.
178 See id. at 9.
179 See generally Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (holding that South Carolina
is a "market participant" to the extent that it sells goods to its own citizens).
180 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
685 (1999) (rationalizing that when acting as proprietors, states should "'share existing
freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of the [dormant] Com-
merce Clause'" (quoting White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,
207-08 n.3 (1983)).
181 White, 460 U.S. at 204.
182 See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 446-47.
183 See id. at 439.
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tion doctrine does not shield a state's activity from the dormant Com-
merce Clause.184
In many cases, state action will involve both market participation
and regulation, in which case the market participation doctrine may
still apply. The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Depart-
ment of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis.18 5 In that case, Kentucky had
adopted a rather common tax scheme, which exempted one from pay-
ing taxes on Kentucky-issued bonds, but taxed other types of state-
issued bonds.18 6 This particular tax scheme made state-issued bonds
attractive in comparison to corporate bonds and, ultimately, the state-
bond revenue financed two-thirds of Kentucky's capital expendi-
tures. 187 The state played two distinct roles: one as a market partici-
pant in issuing bonds that would be competitive in a market with
private bond issues, and another as a market regulator in setting taxes
for the bonds.188 The Court determined that in cases in which a state
was acting solely as a market regulator, the traditional dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis applied.' 8 9 But in cases where a state played a
dual role as a participant and regulator, a state should get "excep-
tional treatment" for government activity in commercial markets. The
market participation exception ultimately shielded Kentucky's tax
scheme from a dormant Commerce Clause violation. 190 The Court
then applied a balancing test to determine that the beneficial tax
scheme for the municipal financial market outweighed concerns of
private protectionism that are inherent to dormant Commerce Clause
violations.' 9 '
Although the applicability of the market participant exception to
the dormant interstate Commerce Clause is established, the Supreme
Court has not decisively addressed its applicability to the dormant For-
eign Commerce Clause, 192 and federal circuit courts are split on the
issue. 193 The Third Circuit, on the one hand, applied the market par-
ticipant doctrine to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, noting
no distinction between interstate and foreign commerce in applying
184 See id.
185 Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
186 See id. at 1804-05.
187 See id. at 1805.
188 See id. at 1812.
189 See id. at 1814.
190 See id.
191 See id. at 1817.
192 Cf Reeves, Inc. v. Stake 447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9 (1980) (observing that the Court has
had "no occasion to explore the limits imposed on state proprietary actions by the 'foreign
commerce' Clause" and declining to resolve the issue).
193 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 748 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
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the exception. 19 4 In contrast, the First Circuit declined to apply the
market participation exception on the grounds that foreign com-
merce warranted additional protection. 195
The Third Circuit's position, however, received support from the
Reagan Administration's Office of Legal Counsel. Opposition to
South Africa's apartheid government led to a similar state-divestment
movement in the 1980s that also faced constitutional challenges.1 96
The Justice Department during the Reagan Administration thor-
oughly addressed these legal issues and convincingly applied the mar-
ket participant doctrine to dormant Foreign Commerce Clause issues
in South African divestment statutes. 197 The Office of Legal Counsel
report concluded that "state divestment statutes are plainly proprie-
tary in nature" and that "the state as 'guardian and trustee for its peo-
ple' in spending or investing their funds is as strong when the state's
market participation affects foreign as when it affects interstate
commerce."198
1. The 2007 Illinois Act Violates the Dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause
The dormant Foreign Commerce Clause is likely implicated in
the case of the 2007 Illinois Act. Notably, Congress has affirmatively
spoken about states' Sudan divestment statutes; therefore, preemp-
tion analysis under the Supremacy Clause is enough to invalidate the
2007 Illinois Act. However, even if the SADA did not preempt the
2007 Illinois Act, it would still violate the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause. The 2007 Illinois Act impermissibly burdens foreign com-
merce, impedes the nation's ability to speak with one voice, and is not
shielded by the market participation exception.
The 2007 Illinois Act violates the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause by facially discriminating against foreign commerce by limit-
ing trade with a specific nation. 19 9 The Supreme Court in Crosby did
not address the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause claim, invalidat-
194 Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1990).
195 Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), aff'd in result sub
nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000) (affirming the
result on Supremacy Clause grounds and declining to address the First Circuit's conclu-
sions regarding the foreign affairs power or the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause).
196 See Constitutionality of South African Divestment Statutes Enacted by State and Lo-
cal Governments, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 49, 51-52 n.6 (1986).
197 See id. at 52-59.
198 See id. at 53-54. The report also goes through market-participation doctrine re-
strictions, concluding that these arguments do not apply to state divestment statutes. See id.
at 56.
199 See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 68.
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ing the Massachusetts law instead on preemption grounds.200 Massa-
chusetts had regulated state contracts that were doing business in
Burma in order to support freedom and democracy in Burma.201 The
First Circuit decision in Natsios held that the Massachusetts law facially
discriminated against foreign commerce because a "chief goal ...
[was] to affect business decisions pertaining to a foreign nation. '" 20 2
The law impermissibly restricted both Burmese businesses and Ameri-
can businesses in Burma. 20 3
The 2007 Illinois Act prohibits the state treasurer and state and
municipal pension funds from investing in companies that are con-
ducting certain business in or with Sudan.20 4 Similar to the state law
in Nastios, Illinois' chief goal is to affect business in Sudan, to decrease
available funds for the Sudanese government's genocide funding.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause still applies in instances where the state law does
not intend to favor in-state interests over out-of-state interests.20 5
Thus, Illinois' intention to condone terrorism, rather than further the
interests of Illinois businesses or contracts, does not shield the statute
from the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.
Additionally, Illinois impedes the nation's ability to speak with
"one-voice." 20 6 The 2007 Illinois Act restricts industries, regions, and
companies in Sudan that go beyond the federal government's restric-
tions laid out in the SADA. By potentially punishing companies that
the federal government does not seek to punish, the 2007 Illinois Act
prevents the federal government's uniformity in dealing with Sudan.
A further consideration is whether the market participation ex-
ception permits Illinois' actions. As discussed above, the applicability
of the market participation exception to the dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause is unclear. If the market participation exception does
not apply to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, then Illinois'
burden on foreign commerce is not excepted, and the 2007 Illinois
Act is unconstitutional under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.
Alternatively, even if the market participation exception does ap-
ply to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, it still is unlikely to
permit the 2007 Illinois Act. Illinois restricts the choice of companies
200 See generally Crosby, 530 U.S. 363 (affirming the judgment of Natsios on preemption
grounds and declining to address the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause issue).
201 See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 45-46.
202 See id. at 68.
203 See id. ("Long-standing Supreme Court precedent indicates that the Framers were
concerned with 'discriminations favorable or adverse to commerce with particular foreign
nations [under] state laws."').
204 See 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/0.01 (2007); 40 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/1-101.
205 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276 (1988).
206 SeeJapan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (quoting Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
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in which both state and municipal pension funds can invest. For state
pension funds, Illinois is arguably acting as a market participant. Just
as in Davis, where Kentucky exempted its own state bonds from taxes,
the 2007 Illinois Pension Act places limitations on state-managed in-
vestments. In Davis, state action was justified as participation because
it was affecting its competitive advantage in the bond market as com-
pared to corporate bonds. For Illinois, its actions too can be justified
as participation because of the effect it has on companies that take
investment from Illinois pension funds over private investment funds.
The distinction in Illinois' case is that, rather than create a competi-
tive advantage for its state pension funds, it is instead creating a disad-
vantage for Illinois state pensions by restricting their investment
options. Still, Illinois' action can be justified as private activity because
Illinois is controlling its state pension fund in the same way that a
private investment fund could control what investments it makes. 20 7
However, Illinois' limitations on state pension fund investments
can also arguably constitute market regulation. Illinois is limiting its
state pension fund investments. But Illinois is also seeking to regulate
the activity of the companies in which these state pension funds would
invest. In Natsios, the First Circuit emphasized the state's role as a
market regulator when regulating state contracts with companies do-
ing business in Burma because of the state's attempt to change the
behavior of the companies. 208 Moreover, the companies' behavior
that Massachusetts attempted to change was unrelated to the business
it was doing with the state. 20 9 Massachusetts had created a selective
list and was monitoring the activity of private actors, not merely its own
state actions as a private participant. 210 Illinois is similarly seeking to
change the behavior of the companies with which the state pension
funds conduct business and has created a list211 to monitor the activity
of these private companies. Further, Illinois is regulating the compa-
nies' business with Sudan, which may likely be unrelated to the invest-
ment that the state pension funds are making with the company.
Hence, for state pension funds, Illinois is acting both as a market
participant and a market regulator. Illinois acts as a market partici-
pant by placing limitations on its state pension funds, the same way
that a private investment fund could limit its investment decisions. Il-
linois acts as a market regulator by attempting to regulate the behav-
ior of the companies in which it invests, companies that the state
could not regulate as a market participant. The Supreme Court in
207 See Sal Tinnerello & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Stonington, 141 F.3d 46, 55 n.10 (2d Cir.
1998).
208 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 63 (1st Cir. 1999).
209 See id.
210 See id. at 64.
211 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.6(b) (2007).
[Vol. 94:669
GENOCIDE FUNDING
Davis held that when a state acts as both a market participant and a
market regulator, the market participation doctrine may still shield its
actions from the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.212 Therefore,
for state pension funds alone, Illinois may still be protected by the
market participation doctrine.
For municipal pension funds, on the other hand, the market par-
ticipation exception does not apply because the state is regulating in-
vestments of municipalities, not its own state investments. Illinois
does not satisfy the test that its actions constitute participation in the
municipal pension market because, as a private actor, Illinois would
have no ability to limit the municipal pension funds.213
Because the 2007 Illinois Pension Act is constitutional under the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause only as applied to state pension
funds, and not to municipal pension funds, the statute as a whole is
unconstitutional under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. The
2007 Illinois Act includes a severability clause, that the "provisions of
this Act are severable" under Illinois law.2 14 Illinois' severability stat-
ute states that the invalidity of a portion of a statute does not invali-
date other portions if those provisions "can be given effect without the
invalid application or provision."2 15 The Court in Giannoulias deter-
mined that because the 2005 Illinois Pension Act applied to all code-
defined "pension fund [s]," severing the statute would require rewrit-
ing the statute; the Supreme Court restricts courts from so doing.216
Similarly, in the 2007 Illinois Pension Act, "pension fund" refers to
benefit funds of the "State or of any county, city, town, municipal cor-
poration . . . located in the State of Illinois."217 Thus, to sever the
unconstitutional portion of the statute would require improperly re-
writing municipalities out of the statute. Therefore, the 2007 Illinois
Act is also unconstitutional in its entirety under the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause.
2. The SDTF Model Does Not Violate the Dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause
The dormant Foreign Commerce Clause does not apply to the
SDTF Model because Congress affirmatively authorized state action
under the SADA, and the SDTF Model falls within this authoriza-
212 See discussion supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
213 See Sal Tinnerello & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Stonington, 141 F.3d 46, 55 n.10 (2d Cir.
1998).
214 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.6(b) § 97.
215 5 ILL. CoM\p. STAT. 70/1.31.
216 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 750 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
217 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/22-401.
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tion.2 18 In areas of foreign commerce, the nation speaks with "one
voice," and Congress is that voice. 2 19 Inherent in this power is the
ability to give states the power to regulate commerce.2 20 Foreign in-
vestment and divestment "unquestionably fall within Congress's power
to regulate foreign commerce." 22 1 Here, the SADA authorizes state
action under the SDTF Model that grants states power in an area
where their activity may have otherwise violated the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause.22 2 The SADA is clear: "the United States Govern-
ment should support the decision of any State or local government" in
its divestments from Sudan, so long as it meets the SADA's require-
ments. 223 Further, just as it did in the Supremacy Clause context, the
Justice Department's memo that questioned the constitutionality of
the SDTF Model also conceded that the SADA may remove the threat
of dormant Foreign Commerce Clause violations."224
IV
THE PRESIDENT'S POWER AND DIVESTMENT STATUTES: THE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
2 2 5
A. The Foreign Affairs Power
The federal government maintains responsibility over foreign af-
fairs, and although Congress has power over war and foreign com-
merce, the President has the authority to determine specific policies
218 See supra Part II.B.1.
219 See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994); Letter
from Paul H. Schwartz, Legal Counsel, Sudan Divestment Task Force, to Richard B. Che-
ney, Vice President of the U.S. 3 (Nov. 7, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Schwartz
Memo].
220 See id.
221 Schwartz Memo, supra note 219.
222 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, § 3(a), 121
Stat. 2516, 2518 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)).
223 See id.
224 Justice Dep't Memo, supra note 11, at 3.
225 The Supreme Court has been relatively quiet about the foreign affairs power,
addressing the issue in very few cases since 1968. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (reversing the Court of Appeals' decision on
agency deference grounds and failing to address the scope of the President's foreign affairs
power); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 734 (2004) (KennedyJ., dissenting)
("The question the Court seems inclined to resolve-can the foreign affairs power of the
Executive supersede a statutory scheme set forth by Congress-is simply not presented by
the facts of this case."); Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419-20 (2003)
(addressing the foreign affairs power but not elaborating on its application absent
affirmative federal action); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8
(2000) (affirming the First Circuit's holding solely because of the Supremacy Clause and
declining to discuss the foreign affairs power); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 292 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting a possible tension between the
Fourth Amendment and the foreign affairs power if non-law-enforcement activities are
directed against enemy aliens in non-wartime but nonetheless implicating national
security).
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with regard to foreign relations. 226 In particular, the President has
the power to make executive agreements with other countries.227 Just
as congressional statutes dealing with foreign policy may preempt
state laws through the Supremacy Clause and the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause, valid executive agreements with foreign nations
may also preempt certain state laws through the Foreign Affairs
Power.228 The dormant Foreign Commerce Clause prohibits state in-
terference with Congress's power over foreign commerce, while the
Foreign Affairs Power prohibits state interference with any federal law
affecting foreign affairs. The Constitution does not expressly prohibit
state action that may have some effect on the federal government's
foreign affairs authority. 229
The standard for invalidating a statute under the Foreign Affairs
Power typically depends upon which of three different categories a
state statute falls into. First, if an executive agreement expressly
preempts a state action, a statute is invalid.230 Preemption in this cir-
cumstance is similar to preemption by congressional treaties or laws
under the Supremacy Clause.
Second, if express preemption does not invalidate a state statute,
but affirmative federal action exists, a state action may still be invalid
as an interference with foreign affairs. 231 If evidence exists of a "clear
conflict between the policies" adopted by the federal executive and a
state, the state law is invalid. As recently as 2003, the Supreme Court
in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi used the Executive's For-
eign Affairs Power to invalidate a California state law that encouraged
litigation by making it an unfair business practice to reject Holocaust
survivors' valid insurance claims. 232 The state law conflicted with ex-
ecutive agreements with other foreign governments, which necessi-
tated working with an international Holocaust commission to facilitate
better relations through settling insurance claims. 233 Ultimately, Cali-
226 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413-14. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress
the power to, inter alia, regulate foreign commerce, create naturalization rules, and declare
war), and id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from entering into treaties, alliances, or
confederations), with id. art. 1I, § 2, cls. 1, 2 (granting the President power over the armed
forces as Commander-in-Chief and authorizing the President to make treaties).
227 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414.
228 See id. at 416.
229 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cis. 1-3 (prohibiting states from entering into treaties,
alliances, or confederations, from imposing duties on exports or imports without congres-
sional consent, from imposing duties on war ships in time of peace without congressional
consent, and from entering into agreements with foreign powers).
230 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416-17.
231 See id. at 417.
232 See id. at 420-26.
233 See id. The Court also emphasized that the executive agreements in this case were
sufficient to preempt state law. See id. at 416-17.
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fornia sought "to use an iron fist where the President has consistently
chosen kid gloves." 23 4
Under this second scenario, state laws that have only an "inciden-
tal or indirect effect" on foreign countries do not violate the federal
government's exclusive power to handle foreign affairs. 235 In Clark v.
Allen, for instance, the Supreme Court upheld a state probate statute
that gave certain rights to heirs in Germany. 236 It had only an "inci-
dental or indirect effect" on a foreign country because local law tradi-
tionally governed succession rights, no overriding federal treaty
existed, and the state law was still compatible with federal law restrict-
ing money from American accounts to Germany. 237 Subsequently, in
Zschernig v. Miller,238 the Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon pro-
bate statute similar to the one in Clark as an intrusion into foreign
affairs because it had "more than 'some incidental or indirect effect in
foreign countries,' and . . . great potential for disruption or embar-
rassment."239 Justice Douglas, who wrote the majority opinion in both
Clark and Zschering, distinguished the two cases by indicating that the
petitioner in Clark was challenging the statute on its face, rather than
on grounds that the legislative motive was to prevent American assets
from going to "hostile nations." 240 The two cases, however, are argua-
bly the same and have created confusion among courts applying the
"incidental or indirect effect" standard. 241
Third, consistent with the Supreme Court's position is that states
may legislate in an area of their "traditional competence" even if it has
more than an incidental and indirect effect on foreign policy, as long
as there has been no affirmative federal action. 242 The Court in
Garamendi presented this view through Justice Harlan's concurrence
in Zschernig. prior Supreme Court decisions indicated that "in the ab-
sence of a conflicting federal policy . . . the States may legislate in
234 See id. at 427.
235 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947).
236 See id. at 510.
237 See id. at 517.
238 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
239 See id. at 434-35 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. at 517).
240 See id. at 433 n.5.
241 See Dhooge, supra note 31, at 284-85 (pointing out that "the First Circuit specifi-
cally noted that '[t]he precise boundaries of the Supreme Court's holding in Zschering are
unclear' and that '[slubsequent Supreme Court decisions have done little to clarify the
reach of the Court's holding"' (quoting Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d
38, 51-52 (1st Cir. 1999)).
242 The Court leaves this is as a "further question." Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539
U.S. 396, 419-20 & n.l (2003). Nonetheless, as Professor Robert Strumberg remarks, a
substantial amount of scholarship exists, which argues that "absent a clear conflict or state-
ment of congressional intent to preempt state or local law, the federal foreign affairs power
alone does not render a state or local law unconstitutional." Robert Strumberg, Preemption
& Human Rights: Local Options After Crosby v. NFTC, 32 LAw & POL'V INT'L Bus. 109, 111
(citing an extensive list of scholarship).
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areas of their traditional competence even though their statutes may
have incidental effect on foreign relations. '243 Accordingly, when rul-
ing on the validity of state statutes that affect foreign affairs, courts
should consider the state's interest in relation to the effect on foreign
policy. 244 In Garamendi, the Court refrained from a decision on the
matter, but opined in dicta that under this view "it might make good
sense to require a conflict. 24
5
Courts also look for the state law's actual hindrance of U.S. for-
eign policies in analyzing the impact of the national government's
ability to implement its foreign policy for purposes of a Foreign Affairs
Power analysis. In Giannoulias, for instance, the court maintained that
the 2005 Illinois Moneys Act "would have an impact ... that is at least
equal to or greater than the impact of the state laws in Zschernig and
Garamendi.'' 246 Indeed, the Act had already caused non-compliant
banks to lose $275 million and "[t]he risk of losing state deposits
could, as the Illinois legislature hoped, pressure banks to stop ac-
cepting loan applications from entities doing business in Sudan."
247
The fact that bank customers knew the Act had caused them to lose
this money forces them to choose between cutting ties to Sudan and
continuing doing business with the bank.248 The court opined that
the federal government, not state governments, has the authority to
create foreign policy in relation to Sudan, and therefore the federal
government should create that policy.
249
Moreover, the court in Giannoulias held that the amendment to
the 2005 Illinois Pension Act did not violate the Foreign Affairs Power
because it lacked an actual impact on the federal government's for-
eign affairs policy for Sudan.2 50 Rather, the reduced demand for a
particular stock created a decrease in the stock price, producing only
243 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 458-59 (Harlan, J., concurring); accord
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 418-19. Justice Harlan concurred in Zschering because the state
statute at issue in that case conflicted with a federal treaty. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 457
(Harlan, J., concurring). The competing view, implied by the Zschering majority, is that a
state law is preempted if it has more than an incidental effect on foreign affairs. This view
does not require either that the federal government have taken affirmative action in the
area or that a conflict between federal and state law exists. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at
419-20 & n.l. Both views agree that preemption occurs in the presence of conflict be-
tween federal and state law. See id.
244 See id. at 420. Even under the view that considers a state's interest, the Garamendi
court leaves open the question of whether this would support consideration of a federal
interest. See id.
245 See id. 419 n.11.
246 Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 745 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
247 Id.
248 See id. at 746.
249 See id.
250 See id. at 745-46.
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a "hypothetical impact" on foreign policy.2 5 1 The court emphasized
that these potential decreases in stock prices did not indicate that the
companies would decide not to do business in Sudan.252 Unlike the
Illinois State Moneys Act, the "inability to offer debt or equities to
Illinois public pension funds" under the 2005 Illinois Pension Act cre-
ates a burden that "is entirely speculative." 253
1. The 2007 Illinois Act Violates the Foreign Affairs Power
The 2007 Illinois Act interferes with the federal government's
power, which includes the SADA and the Executive Order issued by
President Clinton. The Executive Order generally prohibits exports
and imports with Sudan, the performance of certain contracts with
Sudan, and transactions relating to the transportation of cargo with
Sudan. 254 It does not explicitly deal with state divestment statutes
targeted at Sudan, nor does it explicitly preempt state divestment ac-
tivity. The SADA, conversely, does unambiguously authorize particu-
lar state divestment activity targeted at Sudan, which the 2007 Illinois
Act exceeds. 255 The 2007 Illinois Act falls under the second scenario
of Foreign Affairs Power violations. In this case, no express preemp-
tion by federal law of the Illinois divestment scheme has occurred;
however, the federal government has affirmatively acted in the area of
state divestment directed at Sudan in a way that conflicts with Illinois
policy.
The actual conflict between the SADA and the 2007 Illinois Act 25 6
is similar to that in Garamendi. In Garamendi, the state law encourag-
ing litigation of Holocaust survivor claims conflicted with express fed-
eral policy that encouraged settlement of these claims. 25 7 Here, the
federal policy through the SADA requires state divestment statutes to
exclude certain business operations in an apparent effort to reduce
the impact on Sudanese civilians while still having an effect on the
government of Sudan.2 58 The Illinois statute violates this federal re-
quirement by mandating pension fund divestment from companies
that the federal government has made a policy to exclude. 259 Illinois
251 See id. at 745.
252 See id.
253 See d. at 746.
254 See Exec. Order No. 13,067, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1997), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701
(2006).
255 See supra Part III.B.2.
256 See also supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
257 See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420-26 (2003).
258 See Sudan Divestment UK, FAQ's, http://72.167.8.38/faqs.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2009) (stating that agriculture is specifically excluded from the SDTF Model Legislation
because agriculture employs 80 percent of the Sudanese workforce).
259 Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 745 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
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then is using an "iron fist" where the SADA is using "kid gloves." 2 60 As
a result, just as in Garamendi, the state's actual conflict with the express
federal policy is "alone enough to require state law to yield." 261
Still, there is more than merely an incidental and indirect effect
on Sudan. Zschering and Clark's seemingly different applications of
the incidental and indirect effect standard do create confusion.
262
However, the very purpose behind the Illinois statute is to reduce the
Sudanese government's funds for genocide. Giannoulias held that the
2005 Illinois Act had already created at least a $275 million loss for
banks that did not abide by the Act and that the very direct choice
between business in Sudan and receiving investments from state and
municipal pension funds had an actual incidental and indirect ef-
fect.26 3 The 2007 Illinois Act creates the same effect on companies
doing business in Sudan. If companies opt to receive investments
from state and municipal pension funds, they must cut business ties
with Sudan.
B. Congress's Authorization and the Foreign Affairs Power
A federal statute authorizing certain state activity should shield
states from violating the executive's Foreign Affairs Power for that par-
ticular activity, unless the federal statute itself is unconstitutional. The
Executive Branch and the Justice Department under George W. Bush
contend that a federal authorizing statute does not remove constitu-
tional concerns under the Foreign Affairs Power, arguing that "the
President's general Article II foreign affairs power can trump an oth-
erwise proper federal statute."26 4 Consequently, the balance of the
separation of powers between Congress's Article I power and the Pres-
ident's Article II power then comes into question.
The President's power to issue an order "must stem either from
an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself. ' 265 The rather
cryptic nature of Article II of the Constitution has led to two schools
of thought regarding the power of the Executive in foreign relations,
espoused by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison.2 66 Hamilton
interpreted Article II as granting the President exclusive authority
over foreign affairs, because although Article I gives Congress author-
ity "herein granted"267 and enumerates specific powers-power over
260 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 427.
261 See id. at 425.
262 See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
263 Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
264 Schwartz Memo, supra note 219, at 2.
265 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
266 See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 39-40
(2d ed. 1996).
267 U.S. CONST. art. I, §1.
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foreign affairs not among them-Article II states that " [t] he executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." 268 Therefore, the President's powers would extend beyond
those explicitly enumerated in the subsequent clauses of Article 11.269
Madison disagreed, believing this would "import into the Constitution
British monarchial prerogatives. '" 2 70
Justice Jackson's well-known 271 concurring opinion in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawye 2 7 2 laid out three categories by which to eval-
uate the President's authority vis-a-vis Congress. 273 The first category
applies if Congress has, either expressly or impliedly, authorized the
President's actions; this category is where the President has the great-
est power.274 The second category applies if the President acts in the
absence of congressional authorization or denial of his actions. 275 If
operating in the "zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain," 276 the
President's authority is not as broad as in the first category. The third
category is one in which the President acts contrary to a federal stat-
ute.2 77 Here, the President's power "is at its lowest ebb, for then he
can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitu-
tional powers of Congress over the matter."278 The President's actions
are only justified if Congress exceeded its own Article I power. 279
Youngstown fell into the third category.280 The Supreme Court held
President Truman's Executive Order directing seizure of steel mills
during the Korean War unconstitutional because statutes granted
Congress the authority to seize property in wartime. 281 The Presi-
dent's order had attempted to direct Congress to execute policy as
prescribed by the President.2 2 In actuality, "[t]he Constitution does
not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or mili-
tary supervision or control." 28 3
268 Id. art. II, § 1; see also HENKIN, supra note 266, at 40.
269 See HENKIN, supra note 266, at 39.
270 Id. at 40.
271 Discussions about congressional limitations on executive authority frequently cite
the framework Justice Jackson created in his Youngstown concurrence. See, e.g, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.28 (2006); id. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring), id. at 680
(Thomas, J., dissenting); HENKIN, supra note 266, at 40.
272 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
273 See id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
274 See id. at 635-36.
275 See id. at 637.
276 Id.
277 See id. at 637-38.
278 See id. at 637.
279 See id. at 637-68.
280 Id. at 639-40.
281 See id. at 585-89.
282 See id. at 588.
283 See id.
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A more recent Supreme Court decision, Hamdan v. Runsfeld,28 4
drew on Justice Jackson's framework in Youngstown to emphasize that
the President may not disregard congressional limitations on execu-
tive powers. 28 5 In that case, President George W. Bush had used his
Article II powers to create a military commission to try an alien, Salim
Ahmed Hamdan, whom the U.S. military had captured in Afghanistan
and transported to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.28 6 The military commis-
sion violated substantive and procedural requirements set up by the
statutes in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 2 8 7 and the
Geneva Conventions. 28 8 The President was acting "in a field with a
history of congressional participation and regulation," bringing the
inquiry into category three of Justice Jackson's framework. 28 9 All
eight of the participating justices 290 seemed to agree that the Presi-
dent does not have the authority to override Congress. 29 1 The justices
seemed to disagree, however, about whether a statute subsequent to
the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions had given the President ex-
press authority to act. 292 If the UCMJ and the Geneva Convention
had authorized the President's actions, then Hamdan's prosecution
would have fallen into category one of Youngstown and changed the
constitutional analysis. Ultimately, the Justices unanimously recog-
nized congressional limits on the President's Article II powers.
1. The SDTF Model Does Not Violate the Foreign Affairs Power
State activity under the SDTF Model comports with the SADA's
authorization of state divestment statutes and does not violate the For-
eign Affairs Power. The SADA clearly authorizes state divestment stat-
utes under the SDTF Model, and Congress was clear that statutes
legislated under the SADA's requirements are not preempted by any
federal law.
284 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
285 See id. at 593 & n.23.
286 See id. at 566.
287 See id. at 567.
288 See id.
289 See id. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
290 Chief Justice Roberts recused himself from the decision because he was involved in
the case at the appellate level. See Bill Mears, High Court Blocks Gitmo Military Tribunals,
CNN, Aug. 28, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/06/29/scotus.tribunals/index.
html.
291 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591-92 (" 'But neither can the President... intrude upon
the proper authority of Congress ... ' (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139
(1866))); id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Congress has denied the President the legis-
lative authority to create military commissions of the kind at issue here."); id. at 636-37
(KennedyJ., concurring) ("Congress... has ... set limits on the President's authority.");
id. at 798 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that "procedural regulations promulgated by
the Executive must not be 'contrary to' the UCMJ").
292 See id. at 655 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The current Executive Order on Sudan is limited to prohibitions
on exports, imports, credit and loan extensions, and transactions re-
lated to cargo transportation. As discussed above, it does not ex-
pressly preempt or even discuss state divestment activity. Any future
executive order that would expressly preempt state divestments under
the SADA does not invalidate the SDTF Model as is because the Model
includes a provision that it expires when further legislation or an ex-
ecutive order declares it in conflict with U.S. foreign policy.
President George W. Bush's signing statement that accompanied
the SADA declared that state divestment statutes under the SADA
could still be unconstitutional under the Executive's authority. Presi-
dent Bush described the "risk[ ]" that the SADA would be interpreted
as "insulating from Federal oversight State and local divestment ac-
tions that could interfere with implementation of national foreign
policy. '293 This position indicates that he could have issued an execu-
tive order creating an express conflict between the Executive and state
policy. In fact, it is unlikely that the Executive has such power. An
executive order that is "incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress" 294 would fall under Justice Jackson's third scenario,
in which the President cannot use his Article II powers to exceed Con-
gress's explicit authorization, unless Congress exceeded its own power
in granting authorization.295 The SADA is within Congress's authority
because Article I grants Congress authority over foreign commerce,
and "[i] nvestment in and divestment from foreign companies unques-
tionably fall within Congress's power to regulate foreign com-
merce."296 Congress has also found authority in the Commerce
Clause to "impose embargoes on unfriendly countries" and has legis-
lated sanctions on other countries in the past.29 7 Although the Presi-
dent and the Justice Department argue that authorization of state
divestment statutes weaken the President's Article II authority to
"speak for the Nation with 'one voice' on issues of foreign policy,"2 98
this position underestimates Congress's role in foreign affairs. 299
A challenge to a California franchise tax calculation presented a
similar argument in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board3 00-that
the tax weakened the federal authority's ability to speak with one
293 See President Bush's Statement, supra note 10.
294 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
295 See supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
296 Schwartz Memo, supra note 219.
297 HENKIN, supra note 266, at 66.
298 Justice Dep't Memo, supra note 11, at 3 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
440 (1968)); see also President Bush's Statement, supra note 10.
299 See Schwartz Memo, supra note 219.
300 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
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voice on foreign affairs.301 The Court rejected the argument because
"Congress implicitly ha[d] permitted the States" to calculate the
franchise tax in that manner. 30 2 "Congress, not the President, [has]
the power to 'regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"' and the Pres-
ident is the "preeminent speaker" for foreign commercial issues.
30 3
The President "cannot render unconstitutional [a state's] otherwise valid,
'congressionally condoned actions.'"304 Thus, the current federal policy
under the SADA ensures that the SDTF Model is constitutional, with
or without an executive order expressing Presidential disapproval.
CONCLUSION
The introduction of the SADA on December 31, 2007 changed
the legal environment for recent questions of constitutionality of state
divestment statutes directed toward Sudan. The SADA does not pro-
vide blanket authorization for all state divestment statutes; more spe-
cifically, although it does authorize the SDTF Model, it does not
authorize Illinois' divestment scheme. The 2007 Illinois Act, there-
fore, violates the Supremacy Clause, the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause, and the Foreign Affairs Power because Congress affirmatively
stated the permissible scope of state divestment statutes and the Illi-
nois scheme exceeded this scope, thus creating a conflict with federal
policy.
The SDTF Model statutes adopted in nineteen states are constitu-
tional, however, because the SADA does authorize these state divest-
ment schemes. Explicit congressional authorization protects these
state divestment statutes from violating the Supremacy Clause, the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, and the Foreign Affairs Power, as
the state statutes fall within the scope of the SADA. Congressional
authorization through the SADA more obviously shields state statutes
that fall within its scope from potential violations of the Supremacy
Clause and dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, which derive from
Congress's Article I powers. The Foreign Affairs Power, in contrast,
includes the President's Article II powers. The SADA still protects the
SDTF Model from the Foreign Affairs Power because no executive or-
der currently overrides the Sudan divestment statutes, and with Presi-
dent Obama now in office, the situation is likely to remain this way.
Even so, the President cannot act contrary to the SADA, as Congress
had the authority through its dormant Foreign Commerce Power to
enact the legislation.
301 See id. at 320.
302 Id. at 326 (citation omitted); see Schwartz Memo, supra note 219.
303 Barclays Bank PLC, 512 U.S. at 329 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
304 Schwartz Memo, supra note 219 (quoting Barclays Bank PLC, 512 U.S. at 330).
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The constitutionality of these state divestment statutes under con-
gressional authority has important implications for state activity in
other foreign countries, as states are following the Sudan Divestment
Movement to divest assets from countries such as Iran, North Korea,
Syria, and Cuba. At the same time, the Bush Administration had
pushed a broad interpretation of the Executive's Article II powers, dis-
missing the Legislative and the Judicial Branches' limitations on the
Executive Branch's authority. Given the complexity and globalization
of foreign policy and commercial relations, states may have a more
active role in implementing the federal government's foreign policy.
This implementation does not immediately suggest that states are cre-
ating their own policy that will detract from the United States' foreign
policy. Rather, if states remain faithful to what the federal govern-
ment deems their permissible role in foreign affairs, this approach
strengthens the country's impact on foreign relations and the ability
of the United States to condemn human rights violations such as
those in Sudan.
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